

REGIONALISM AND ITS SHELTERS. THE PROBES OF THE COLD WAR ERA AND THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Ioana-Bianca Berna
Daniela-Anamaria Radu

Abstract:

Nowadays, the world's stares of wonderment revolve around how successful regional actors have become in channeling the regional organizations they created in envisioning a set of prescriptions for a law-abiding regional conduct. Many of the regional products of today's were blueprinted by the socialization of normative convergence of former periods. Our article is not intended to disseminate on-look perspectives upon the state of the regional security environment in different parts of the world, nor to disseminate the anemoscope of how wide the regional organizations have shot in furnishing the appropriate results for the regional security environment.

Our purposeful aim is to deliver an extradite of how regionalism has been bestowed upon an attendant position in global arena, by juxtaposing the Cold War Era and the post-Cold War Era. We jibed the agreement that transitive acquiescing has been performed between the two types of regionalism during these two time-frames. Also, we account for the consideration that regionalism enlarges on the expatiations of compounded interestingness between the actors, geographically encroached into a regional area, which entertain topics of engagement, based on a considerable amount of concern with each other and on an equivalency of interest in a plurality of security situations.

Keywords: Regionalism, Old Regionalism, New Regionalism.

Eye-shot on the Conspicuous Make-Up of Regionalism in the Cold War Era

Research conducted on regional security dynamics has found new sources of inspiration and has embarked on a very insightful scientific venture. The *Old Regionalism of the Cold War Era* has collapsed with the emergence of the unipolar momentum. In order to prepare for all of the eventual leaps and evolutions assumed by this article we have enclosed in this section a modest radiograph of some of the relevant research we have gone through up to now for the cognizance of *regionalism in the Cold War Era*. The literature concerning the growing complexity of regional security and emergent regional security structures, in particular, has not been abundant. The systemic security theories, in *the Cold War Era*, regarded the regional level as easily penetrable by the two omnipresent global actors – United States and the Soviet Union - and, hence, did not gratify it with an independent status. Global interventions were the main modifiers of the regional security dynamics and *a self-propelled regional order* was, by all means, an unthinkable hypothesis. The

main argument was, that, ever since Westphalia, the systemic level has exerted a strategic dominance over the sub-systemic level: “the regional level was structurally open to global interventions” (Kelly:2007). Virtually unable to oppose the systemic pressures, the sub-systemic actors had to accommodate to the globally stirred regional architectures. Creating stable regional environments was an outcome only the two superpowers could help provide.




Figure 1: Old Regionalism's Chandelier (apud Kelly:2007);

As shown in the above figure, the relationship between the primary system and the regional subsystems was a relationship of *subordination*. The *global-regional interaction* was not shaped by the regional, domestic evolution, nor was it mutually oriented. It was characterized by a *policy of a regional profound engagement* from the primary system that purposefully conditioned and defined all interactional variables. Regional assertiveness was highly unlikely to grow exponentially as the two superpowers anxiously debated which new regions to add to their spheres of influence. Therefore, the primary system posed an absolute threat to the ascending regional orders.

In the Cold War Era, regions were cartographically identified! Undoubtedly, The European Community stood out as an example of a region which has surpassed the traditional determinants of geographical proximity and developed its *regionness* – its own *regional identity* shaped by a wider range of factors than geography: *regional economic integration, regional political integration, legislative normative convergence, normative socialization*. As a result, regions, in the *Old Regionalism*, regions remained very poorly theorized. Nonetheless, some theoretical attempts distinguished themselves more than others. Hass's *neofunctionalist theory* proved to be a vigorous counter-example of the systemic theories: “*neofunctionalism* looked for spillover and

integration, but found instead clubs of dictators and decay” (Hass:1964). Evidently, there were many disagreements regarding the instruments employed in defining a region and admitting new members in the already established regions. Even though geographic density remained a key vector in the definition process, additional variables were acknowledged.

When asking the question if there were trends, during *the Cold-War Era*, that manifested towards the disconnection from the global pressures, accelerating regionally, one can answer *yes*. It is not the purpose of this article to parcel of bi-section to what happened in Europe and what happened in other parts of the world¹. If we are to refer to the critical issues of agenda-setting and to the transitional phases towards this kind of liberty, no-one can deny that Europe ranked first! The trend in favor of independent policies was set by Europe. Other parts of the World – most especially Africa and Asia – defined their security objectives, at first, as a concession to negating oppressive forms of extra-regional meddling – such as: *neo-colonialism* and *neo-imperialism*.²

William Thompson: 1973 (Thompson: 1973);	Kenneth Waltz: 1979 (Waltz:1979);	Barry Buzan: 1986 (Buzan: 1986);
Regular and intense interactions;	Anarchy;	Border;
Geographic proximity;	Polarity;	Anarchy;
Actors recognition of the region as a distinct area;		Polarity;
A minimum of two actors;		Social Construction;

Table 1: Proeminent contributions in the study of regional security characteristics in the Cold War Era;

Overlaying of the regional system by the primary system was a uni-dimensional process, which influenced the future evolutions of regional power establishments. The regional security frameworks geographically identified in the Cold War Era were: *Africa, the Middle East, East Asi and South Asia*. These regions were thought to possess a very relative autonomy-generated regional dynamics and the integration process from within was considered an attempt to stabilize the turbulent domestic arenas in the wake of de - colonization.

¹ Such a bi-section would be more accurately given by specialists administering area studies, as a comparative analysis of regional, autonomous usages of security practices and ideas of security arrangements, would traverse plenty of innate exemplifications;

² They usually came in Western versions; One of the main glistering initiatives that was entertained by regional actors was the *Non-Aligned Movement* – whose first formal Summit was held no sooner than 1961, while the idea for its organization was masterminded during *the Bandung Conference of 1955*; This produced inspirations for many regional initiatives in the non-European security space;

Feature Patterns of Regionalism in the Post-Cold War Era

In *the post-Cold War Era*, the systemic level is no longer viewed as the chief catalyst of the *regional order* and the regional systems and subsystems have developed strategic capabilities to resist the primary system's unilateral pressures. We address the construction of concept of *regional order* as the compartmentalization of specific engagements, whose orientation and instrumentation are directed towards a strategy of accommodation of interests and selection of objectives. By contrast, *world order* is not in the same disposition of placement as regional order is. Within *world order*, the accommodation process is not a covenant of dealings of all the actors, participating on the global arena. It is likely that the actors – partaking in a regional security-setting – have a similar share of influence³.

More often than not, the primary system is not as keen on intervening and influencing all the regional institutional settlements as in the Cold War period. This kind of systemic behavior is considered *unipolar passivism* – which is the systemic hegemon's unwillingness to control even the remotest systemic areas and engage into full dominance. In the past decades, regionalists have delineated some answers for this new turning point in International Relations Studies.

First of all, the world's remaining superpower after the Cold War, the United States does not have at its disposal excessive resources to waste. This situation applies to great powers, also. Actually, the United States and the world's great powers are more likely to concentrate their resources on intervention ventures in regions that fall into their most focal spheres of interest⁴, rather than on regions that do not bear the same strategic importance. To prevent the dilution of force projecting capacities, there is an evident *great power retrenchment* from the regions (apud Lemke:2002).

Secondly, *territoriality* and *geographic juxtaposition* are still an undisputed trademark of world affairs. States are more interested in interacting and perpetuating positive links with their close neighbors, rather than initiating avenues of security and cooperation with *distant states* (apud Kelly:2007). This also stands for conflicting relationships and tensioned inter-state relations. Disagreements and conflicts can more frequently escalate between neighboring states.

Thirdly, the regional security dynamics has an unprecedented intensity. The fixed geographical references that states have can, first of all, be enhanced, enlarged, reduced or updated through interactions with bordering states, or with states pertaining to the same region.

Fourthly, great power interventions in regional security dynamics are often mediated by regional actors. In order to establish a new regional order, reinforce

³ The share of influence may not be equal, but, undoubtedly the level is comparable to the set off of the ambit of world/global influence;

⁴ Regions that seem attractive because of their economic potential or regions with which the bilateral dialogue has been more intense;

an already existent fragile regional order, re-instate norms and principles eradicated by revisionist endogenous powers or promote their own interests, great powers need regional support. This support can best be acquired through regional alliances or through bilateral relations with those states that have the most preponderant influence upon order-producing concerns.

Fifthly, systemic theories are lacking the specificity that regional theories encompass. The systemic theories of the *Old Regionalism – Imperialism and Colonialism* – did not consider the fact that world regions may develop an autonomous security dynamics, nor the fact that preferences could be transmitted bi-directionally and only unilaterally. One of the central arguments of my thesis is that neither the systemic theories, nor the regional theories can be independently verifiable. In the *New Regionalism*, the involvement of the regional community in the global dimension is manifest and does not replicate the posture of the old one. Regions offer a major point of reliance for formulating new conceptual insights for global theories and are ostensibly geared to have an important say in the global arena, especially as far as protecting regional security regimes.

Sixthly, there is an increased need for *eclectic regional theories* (apud Kelly:2007). Regionalists consider that the post-Cold War Era is the perfect moment for launching new theories for regional analysis that can comprehensively describe regional behaviors, instead of downscaling systemic theories. The new theories should be aimed at incorporating all the essential elements of *regionalism* and *regionalization*⁵ that the abstracting systemic theories failed to decipher. It is highly important for the new regional theories to endorse the non-European regional experiences and to facilitate “*a less static perspective upon regional security*” (apud Acharya, Stubbs:2006).

With that end in view, Amitav Acharya points out that through the importance attached to norms, identity and institution-building processes, a *Participatory Regionalism* is going to advance. The *Participatory Regionalism* will represent a core indicator of the way social movements and epistemic communities are taken into account in the study of regional security. *The concept of region* is seeking to include parameters which exceed the security-political axis: *identity, economic interaction or externalities referring to the global and regional security architecture*. The operational readiness of the usage of all these new parameters generates *the multidimensionality of the New Regionalism*. Whether scarcely or obviously in some circumstances, these vectors typify the clear outset of the regions of the *New Regionalism*. In contrast with the *old regionalism*, the *New Regionalism* accentuates two categories of regions. *Physical regions* are regions that can be pinpointed on a map and for which spatial interactions are favored by geographic closeness. *Functional regions*

⁵ Understood as the interconnected process of delineating the strong regional focus that the norms and principles traced by *regionalism* are committed to;

represent a collection of different states that overcome geographic barriers and that are structurally prone to interaction even with states with which they do not share borders. The impetus for interaction is not dissipated in view of mutual interaction preferences, unity of interests in foreign policy projects or economic endeavors. The table below reveals some theories *of the New Regionalism*, praised by the scientific community for their innovative content.

Barry Buzan and the theory of regional security complexes (Buzan: 2000)	Lake and the theory of security externalities (Lake:1997)	Lemke and the transition of power in the Third World - (Lemke: 2002)	Critical theory and regional integration (Björn: 1999)	Inductive approaches (Shambugh: 2005)
Security dilemmas are much harsher in the case of actors engaged in a relationship of territorial proximity;	Regions are not historical or geographical creations, but elevate around security externalities;	Regions are smaller and parallel international systems;	Regionalism can be used to pacify conflicting geopolitical spaces;	A theory building approach based on the prevalence of weak states;
Regions are mini-anarchies;	Regions designate a set of states, affected by a local or a trans-border externality that arises from a certain geographic area;	The regional level has multiple hierarchies;	Regionalism is a tool for re-enacting regional identity and coherence;	An innovative theoretical addition: state strength instead of state power;
Regions can enrich, but not revolutionize International Relations Studies;	Regions can gradually expand and fulfill functional characteristics;	The hierarchies are pyramid-shaped and vertically distributed;	Regionalism is in stark relatedness with multilateralism and global governance;	State strength entails state's coherence and institutional performance;
Regions composed of weak states characterize proto-security complexes;	Geographic delimitations are not considered;	Regional hierarchies have the same structural traits as the global system;	A Defensive Regionalism against a Systemic Hegemonism;	Regionalization without integration;

Table 2: Proeminent contributions in the study of regional security in the post-Cold War Era (apud Kelly:2007);

While the *Old Regionalism* collapsed under the bi-polar resurgence in the 1970's and 1980's, the *New Regionalism* has to confront and overpass other important challenges. *Globalization* and *unipolarism* are the principal menaces to developing autocephalous regional orders. *Globalization* brings with it homogeneity and the sub-systemic import of only one model of statecraft and statist organization: the occidental one. The autochthonous register is unfairly dismissed or under-appreciated, thus backfiring unsuccessful emendations of regional orders. In spite of the current *unipolar passivism*, the possibility of a *unipolar resurrection* is not to be disregarded. The installation of an updated hegemonic ruling is not a bright prospect for the regional emergent security structures that are now forging.




Figure 2: A possible configuration of the New Regionalism;

The configuration of *the New Regionalism* sketched out in *figure 3* is only a possible formula. In the scientific literature surrounding *the New Regionalism*, the rival theoretical claims have traced opposing views. My configuration invokes the basic tenets of inductive approaches and the inferential constructivist discourses. In a brief explanation, the regional subsystems of *the New Regionalism* are no longer in an embryonic stage of development and can sustain trans-regional interactions. Trans-regional interactions are not monopolized by the primary system and the regional subsystems have a visible security identity that allows them to peculiarly produce regional agency.

Concluding Remarks: The Wear and Display of Marked Peculiarities

The lineaments presented by the authors throughout this article have only been intended to portray the properties and specialties of the feature patterns of *regionalism* during the two main periodic instantiations integrated by security studies: *the Cold-*

War Era and the *post-Cold War Era*. We have suggested that the individual nature of *regionalism* has emerged in the *Post-Cold War Era*. This does not mean that prominent attributes of *regionalism* around the world did not develop in the *Cold War Era*. But, they did not run the full-length features that regional orders were able to handhold. These features did grow, progress and unfold in the *Post-Cold War Era*. The hold on the sub-regional security systems by the two super-powers, in *the Cold War Era*, was relentless. Both of them were masked vigilantes, influencing the finale of regional conflicts, by choosing one side, in the detriment of another. Many regional leaders were saddled with the unpleasantness of the patron-role that the extra-regional actors were playing upon the regional orders of the geographical space, imbued with their own physical and geographical coordinates. At first, at the beginning of the Cold War, some regional leaders found the offer – of security guarantee- put forward by the two superpowers, unpalatable. This is how *the Non-Aligned Movement* was born⁶. In *the post-Cold War Era*, the actors, that had a former invisible global reach, would assume a wide-focus of options for their foreign policies⁷. *The post-Cold Era* allowed a focus-shift. We also called in the affidavit, although in no stark formulations, that the warranty of *identity-building* could not have been realized in *the Cold War Era*. *Identity-building* is a self-supporting averment for the corroboration of quasi-monomorphous indistinguishability of purpose, of character of action, of the deliberately-agreed outline of the process of idea-acknowledgment between two or several actors. On a regional-basis, *identity-building* would require more than two actors that would delineate the patterns of steady conformance between intent, judgment, action and interaction. Without the operating distress of super-power involvement, similarity between the regional actors blossomed and I currently blossoming, until it can become character-claimed⁸.

⁶ The bloodline of the non-aligned states was branded in 1955, during *the Asia-Africa Conference*, held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955; The participating countries issued a strong, collective statement against all forms of *colonialism*, of the continuous stream of influences not only from superpowers, but from great powers as well; No-one could be ignorant of the global race for power and domination that did not achieve its peak at that time, but that was accelerating all too rapidly, forcing other actors to take extreme measures; *The Non-Aligned Movement* can be construed as an extreme measure; It reaffirmed the consistent support for an independent path for smaller actors, a path that could be conceived, within their own independent judgment; At a time when in Asia and Africa, the former European colonial powers were trying to re-impose their regional presence without the self-imposition of due restraint from the outer elements, actors situated on a global fringe, decided that their presence in the world order that was laying open, would not be concluded to a pawn-status;

⁷ Regional actors, after the Cold War ended, were not left with a done-up position on the global arena; They had to put in a proper, systematic order security arrangements, and fasten associations with extra-regional actors, without the duress of superpower persuasion; The scope of choice was larger and more propounding;

⁸ Regional politics did not become monocot during *the Cold-War Era* – intra-regional divisions co-existed with cooperative enterprise; Superpower extra-regional influences gathered into a mass of influxes that instigated sectionalisation of interests –regional actors would, at times, decide to trust

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more the superpower security proposals than rely on their regional counterparts, as those proposals would bring them more advantages.

