

INDONESIA NOW. BETWEEN PANCASILA AND CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

Normally in politics will be colored by political activities such as lobbying, transactional politics, money politics, and the most risky trend is likely more rampant corruption because the party trying to increase purse from a variety of sources. The political year 2013 called for Indonesia to meet the 2014 election in which all political parties who passed the verification will prepare themselves for the competition and contestation for legislative elections that will be held April 2014.

The year 2013 was marked by increasing political climate warming caused by not building trust or mutual trust among the parties. Moreover, the pattern of relations between civil society and political parties are also less communicative. Political flare-up in 2013 was also driven by competition parties in preparing to compete in a presidential candidate. Unlike the presidential election 2009, election 2014 not only brings parties and vice presidential candidates, civil society leaders will also deliver an alternative candidate for the party. Civil society demands increasingly shrill make political climate gets hotter. The battle between political parties in convincing the public is not about easy. Meanwhile, fears of losing the election not rule parties would justify all the all the way to win.

As an open ideology, Pancasila should provide orientation to the future which requires the Indonesian people to always be aware of the lives that are being and will face, especially the era of globalization and democracy. Pancasila ideology calls for the Indonesian people still survive in the soul and culture of Indonesia and within the bounds of the State unitary Republic of Indonesia.

And now, the values of Pancasila must constantly be revitalized, to prevent them from becoming obsolete, and at all times be relevant and able to solve issues concerning the nation and State, toward the attainment of a better future, which is a common future. This common future is the future of all ethnic groups, of all ethnic classes and religions, the future of all of us that have determined to be united in an Archipelagic State which is multiethnic, multiracial, and although possessing a large number of disintegrating factors, are strongly bonded in unity, with, by and because of Pancasila. Indonesia's own version of a secular-oriented ideology is "Pancasila" (designed by the nation's first president, Soekarno) since independence, Pancasila has been a sore point for the diversity, who seek at the very least some form of constitutional requirement for the state to enforce democracy.

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Background Issues

Since the founding of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, the Indonesian nation agreed to adopt the *Pancasila* (the Five Principles) as the Indonesian State Philosophy, formulated in paragraph 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which stipulates “therefore, the national independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of the sovereign Republic of Indonesia which is based on the belief in the One and Only God, justice and humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations amongst representatives and the realization of social justice for all of the people of Indonesia”.

Pancasila, as we know today, is the essence of Ir. Soekarno’s speech during a session of the Agency for Investigating Efforts for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence on June 6th 1945, it responds to the primary challenge of the Agency’s session, namely “what shall we adopt as our state philosophy?” And according to *Bung Karno* - meaning Elder Brother Karno as Ir. Soekarno was popularly referred to by the people - he discovered those five principles when delving in the wealth of Indonesia’s own history, culture, and tradition, principles that existed among the Indonesian people since the early days. As indeed, the noble values rediscovered by Bung Karno have been in existence for a long time within our society.

For example “*gotong royong*” - a concept where people share a common burden and work together in mutual cooperation toward a common goal - and tolerance have always been a culture in the Maluku community before 6th June 1945, among others known as a tradition of “*pela-gandong*” where both the Moslem and the Christian communities have been standing side-by-side to help each other. Indeed, during the formulation and subsequent ratification of the State Constitution on 18th August 1945, there were people who proposed Islam to become the Indonesian State philosophy by adding seven Indonesian words to the First Principle to become “...belief in the One and Only God with the compulsory observance of the Islam Syariah Law by its followers”.

But as we know, this proposal was rejected by a number of leaders from Eastern Indonesia who proclaimed that if those seven words were inserted, “it would be better for our brothers and sisters in Eastern Indonesia to be outside of the Republic of Indonesia.” This message was conveyed to *Bung Hatta* (Dr. Drs. H. Mohammad Hatta who became the first Indonesian Vice President) by the Japanese Admiral Maeda, to be passed on to the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence. Bung Hatta subsequently passed on the objection to the members of the Committee, in particular to the Moslem leaders who eventually agreed to delete those seven words (according to several people, the negotiation to delete those seven words only took about 10 minutes).

Why was the negotiation so short and why did the Moslem leaders, at that time with full awareness, agree to the deletion of those seven words? The reason

was that they were all aware that if those seven words were maintained and not deleted, the situation would lead to the disintegration of the state and the nation which was only one day old, meaning that the territory of the Republic of Indonesia would not include the regions of Eastern Indonesia. This consensus was reached because those who were in the Committee and conducted the negotiations were leaders of the nation, not merely politicians, but more than that, they were great statesmen, the founding fathers of the Republic of Indonesia who guided by inner wisdom and understanding, planned and founded the Republic of Indonesia. This also demonstrated the tolerant attitude and recognition by the founders of the republic toward minority groups in Indonesia, and at the same time showed an acknowledgement and awareness of the plurality of the Indonesian nation which only recently proclaimed its independence.

The awareness, acknowledgement, and respect for the nation's plurality contained in and guaranteed by Pancasila, were believed to be capable of uniting the Indonesian nation from one era to another, until today. Eventually, this also gave birth to the nation's motto, namely "Bhineka Tunggal Ika" meaning "Unity in Diversity". However, during the course of time and Indonesian history, the interaction with other nations, and the dynamics of the nation's political life, Pancasila went through ups and downs through differences in interpretation, meaning, and actualization in line with the era of the rulers of the Republic of Indonesia.

When Suharto fell there was a widespread expectation that Indonesia would embark on a swift process of change towards liberal democracy. And yet, the expansion of electoral politics since then does not seem to have led to substantial democratic reforms, much less the establishment of a liberal democracy. Political contestation in Indonesia remains confined to a competing coalition of predatory interests, to the exclusion of civil society forces. Also, with the exercise of predatory power through money politics and political thuggery still constituting a major part of political contestation, the fundamental underpinning of Indonesian politics seems to have changed very little. The primary motivation behind this article is to account for why such a form of political transition has occurred in Indonesia.

Though the literature on Indonesia is varied and diverse, it is probably no exaggeration to say that the major tendency is to emphasise the transitory nature of Indonesian politics, which is seen to be still on its way to liberal democracy. Such a view is informed by a particular theory of democratic transition, which claims to be universal, but which has arisen out of the particular experience of the West (i.e. liberal theory). Driven by a belief in its universal potential, this theory claims that economic development facilitates the emergence of social forces that drive a democratic transition. The end point of such a transition is "Western-style liberal democracy."

By embracing the past, present, and future, Pancasila becomes the basis for all legitimate political activity. After more than a decade since the fall of Suharto,

Indonesian politics has been persistently illiberal in nature. Though elections grew increasingly free and fair after 1998, the expansion of electoral politics has not transformed the clientelist nature of Indonesian politics. Thus despite the expectation that post-Suharto Indonesia would embark on a swift process of change towards a liberal mode of governance, the empowerment of civil society forces has not occurred. The primary motivation of the article was to account for why an illiberal form of politics still persists even after “democratic transition,” which in theory should have been accompanied by the gradual removal of authoritarian elements.

To do this, the article first pointed to the irrelevance of liberal theory in the context of Indonesia and suggested that a redirection of research strategy is needed. From the outset the article emphasised the importance of breaking free from the historical determinism implicit within a liberal interpretation of political change in Indonesia and bringing the insights of area specialists, who question its relevance to East and Southeast Asia, to the wider theoretical debate on democratic transition. In particular, the article took issue with the clear separation of state and society implicit in liberal theory. Instead of searching for civil society forces pressuring the state, the article suggested that one should look for what is occurring within the state.

Political Conditions in Indonesia Now

At the present time, freedom of the press has been achieved in Indonesia, something considered to be missing in the life of the state in the past. Today, the press in Indonesia is able to grow and develop without having to face the threat of being closed down or repressive measures of the ruler. Agencies having the responsibilities for licensing, censorship and closing down of the press no longer exist in Indonesia. The press is free to write anything. Coverage that harms a person or an institution is no longer dealt with using political violence, but rather, it must be accounted for and resolved based on the law in a transparent manner.

Currently, the Indonesian people can freely join and form political parties in accordance with the criteria they themselves agree upon. The Indonesian people are now free to establish political parties without being driven to follow a particular political party, as long as they meet the requirements based on the support of the people themselves.

Why has then such political situation or environment developed?²

² Research data is the United Nations Development Program, the National Development Planning Agency, Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs, and the Ministry of the Interior launched the Indonesian Democracy Index 2010. Overall, the Indonesian democracy index in 2010 decreased from 2009, from 67.30 down to 63.17 value. It means that there is a national index decline by 4:13 points. The variables are grouped into three aspects, namely civil liberties is still relatively good, political rights that are in poor category, and democratic institutions are classified as being of the 33 provinces. For the civil liberties aspects, it dropped from 86.97 in

In the opinion, this has happened due to the tendency of our developing democracy to become somehow liberal without being followed by strong law enforcement. The people's sovereignty has been developing in discordance with the rule of law.

We cannot close our eyes and ears to the fact that there are many people protesting against the reform today. According to them, the New Order regime was right and we been wrong in implementing reform because in reality, the Indonesian nation is increasingly being thrown into disorder. Some even say that we have made a mistake by choosing democracy. Democracy, which is supposed to be from, by and for the people, is in reality only from the people, by the elite and for the political ruler at the present time.

Fourteen years ago, we called out for reform with a collective awareness that a change had to be made and that such change had to be interpreted as democratization in the political life. Subsequently, democracy experienced a leap of tremendous progress that has been often referred to as liberalisation, however, the general condition did not actually improve following the reform. Many people then became upset with the democracy being implemented currently. The results of a study by Saiful Mujani *et al.* in the book, "*Kuasa Rakyat, Analisis tentang Perilaku Pemilih dalam Pemilihan Legislatif dan Presiden Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* (People's Power, an Analysis of the Voters' Behavior in the Legislative and Presidential Elections in Post-New Order Indonesia)" (Mizan, 2012: 443) state that the level of people's participation in the post-New Order general elections decreased quite dramatically from approximately 85% (1999) to approximately 70% (2009). According to the authors, this also illustrates that there has been deterioration in the quality of democracy.

Why is this happening? Have we lost our way in implementing the reform?

After the 1999 General Elections, for the sake of democratization, the 1945 Constitution was amended for the purpose of closing the doors to authoritarianism as well as corruption, collusion and nepotism. Today, we have the 1945 Constitution with, we may say, a far more democratic substance. Following the amendments to the 1945 Constitution, democracy has been manifested in almost all sectors of life in a lively and intense manner.

However, our democracy is still facing many problems. Civil society continues to grow, however, it is not accompanied by the growth of the social order. Freedom as a

2009 to 82.53 to 2010. The measured value of the variable civil liberties, freedom of belief, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom from discrimination.

Aspects of the political right down to 54.60 in 2009 to 47.87 in 2010. The measured value of the variable political rights, the right to elect and be elected, and the right to political participation and decision-making and oversight. To aspects of democratic institutions increased slightly from 62.72 in 2009 to 63.11. Indonesian Democracy Index saw a slight improvement continues to display free and fair elections, the role of Parliament, the role of political parties, the role of the government bureaucracy, and an independent judiciary.

typical symbol of democracy has instead resulted in anarchic and hedonistic behaviors which are contradictory to democracy. Although civil liberties are guaranteed in the constitution, they have not been able to enhance the quality of tolerance which is non-discriminatory against the minorities. Political freedom has been provided space and guarantees, however, it has not been balanced by civil liberties of quality, hence some people say that democracy in Indonesia “has gone too far”. In many parts of this country, numerous cases of oppression, discrimination, and marginalization are still occurring.

In the political arena, power relations have been contaminated by the factors of nepotism and transactional politics. In the government sector, many officials have been indicated, and some of them have even been proven to have acted corruptly, leading to a point where a certain mass media printed it in large letters that our country is a Republic of Corruptors. In the legal sector, law enforcement has not been optimal, with widespread non-compliance with the law, anarchy and mobocracy are still occurring frequently. The law has become blunt for the strongly suspected reason that it is still controlled by the law mafia. At the same time, democracy without law is bound to cause chaos and destroy democracy itself because the state of “democracy being destroyed democratically” can potentially occur. That is why I so often cry out stating that “democracy must be built in line with the development of law”.³

We can say that the sovereignty or power of the people in a democracy has been bought up by a lot of corrupt elites. In reality, democracy is giving room only to the people in power on the momentum of general elections, namely at the time when people are in the voting booths at the polling stations. If we calculate it, the people are enjoying power in democracy for only 5 minutes, while the elite enjoy it for five years or for 41,839 hours and 55 minutes (2,570,395 minutes). These five minutes are counted when a citizen is casting a vote as a voter in the voting booth during the general election. The remaining 41,839 hours and 55 minutes (2570395) are the time for the ruling elites who enjoy partying with the portion of power without any concern for the people who have elected them from the completion of an election until the time for the next election comes.

³ All we can say right now is that our democracy is in crisis because the people are only ‘used’ by the elite to enjoy the power obtained from a transactional democracy. This is what Bung Karno called democracy without *demos*, namely democracy similar to that in post-revolutionary France. Bung Karno made the following statement regarding this matter:

“Let us remember how sometimes the false slogan of democracy does not help the common people; on the contrary, it sacrifices the common people just like what happened in the French Revolution.”

The Development of Indonesia Democracy

Period	Democratic System	Explanation
1945 – 1949	Pancasila Democracy	Implementation of democracy in the reign of a new revolution in parliament is limited to political interaction and the functioning of the press in favor of the revolution. Although not many historical records relating to the development of democracy in this period, but that period has been placed on fundamental matters. First, granting political rights as a whole. Second, the constitutional president is likely to be a dictator. Third, by edict Vice President, then it is possible the formation of a political party that later became the foundation stone for the party system in Indonesia for a later period in the history of our political life.
1949 – 1950	Parliamentary Democracy	In this period the Constitution applies RIS. Indonesia is divided into several states. Adopted the system of government is parliamentary democracy (Liberal Democratic System). Government run by the Prime Minister and the President only as a symbol. Because people generally reject RIS, so on August 17, 1950 President Sukarno declared back into the Unitary State with Provisional Constitution of 1950.
1950 – 1959	Parliamentary Democracy	Cabinet has always alternated, consequently the development does not go smoothly, each party pay more attention to the interests of the party or state faction. After 1950 and Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia to the Liberal Democratic system experienced Indonesian people for nearly 9 years, the Indonesian people are aware that the Provisional Constitution of 1950 with a system Liberal democracy is not suitable, because it does not fit with the spirit of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Finally the President considers that the Indonesian condition endanger national unity actand impedes the development of the universe and plan to fair and prosperous; thus on July 5, 1959 announced the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the decrees of the re-enactment of the 1945 enactment of the Provisional Constitution 1950.
1959 – 1965	Guided Democracy	In this period often called the Old Order. Constitution used is 1945 with guided democracy system. According to the 1945 Constitution, the president is not accountable to Parliament, the president and DPR under MPR. Definition of guided democracy on fourth principle of Pancasila is led by representatives of wisdom in the deliberations, but the president will interpret "guided", ie the leadership is hands' Leader of the Revolution. "Thus the concentration of power in the hands of the president. concentration of forces the cause irregularities in the hands of the president and fraud against Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution which culminates in seizure power from PKI on September 30, 1965 (G30S/PKI) which is national disaster for Indonesia.

Period	Democratic System	Explanation
1966 – 1998	Pancasila Democracy	This period is known as the New Order government, which was determined to implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is genuine and consistent. Strictly implemented system Pancasila Democracy and restored function and high state supreme institution in accordance with the mandate of the 1945 Constitution. In its implementation as a result of the power and the president's term is not restricted period, then piled on the president's power, so that there was abuse of power, with the flourishing culture of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). Restricted freedom of speech, democratic practices become apparent. The department serves as a tool of government power. Thus was born the reform movement spearheaded by students demanding reforms in various fields. The climax is the statement of resignation of Suharto as president.
1998 - Now	Democracy based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution	Democracy developed in the future reforms is essentially based on Pancasila democracy and the 1945 Constitution, with refinement and improvement implementation regulations are not democratic, with the increasing role of higher institutions and the State supreme with confirmed functions, powers and responsibilities of the referring on the principle of separation of powers and procedures of a clear relationship between executive agencies, legislative and judicial branches. Indonesian democracy has now begun with the establishment of the House of Representatives - Assembly Election results 1999 has a president and vice president as well as the creation of institutions to another high..

As I have stated above, we must distinguish democracies into two different domains, namely the conceptual domain and the implementation domain. It is obvious that conceptually, the 1945 Constitution provides guidelines on the type of democracy that we aspire to and the type of democracy that we want to build. There is no problem at the conceptual level, as everything is crystal clear. The democracy that we want to build is not just any democracy, but rather, a people-oriented democracy with the ultimate goal of “public welfare”. In my view, our current crisis of democracy is at the implementation level, therefore, the problem is on how the system is being implemented and no longer on how the system is designed. When it comes to implementation, of course, the problem lies in the moral integrity of the organizers, because no matter how good the concept is, without moral integrity of those responsible, such concepts would be useless.

One of the things that can be done is to make the people become smart voters. The people should be made smart in selecting the elite who will take the top position in power, in order for them not to get trapped into choosing what or who Aristotle called a demagogue. Political recruitment which includes nepotism and which is transactional in nature has so far been proven to produce dirty politicians with negative behavior, who are detrimental to the Indonesian people.

It is also imperative to improve the system and implementation of general elections, including the structuring of the party system. General elections that we

have carried out, although implemented without any interruptions and considered procedurally democratic, have not demonstrated any substantial democratic character.

Of no less importance are the issues of leadership and example. In order to realize a healthy democracy, strong, courageous, incorruptible as well as clean leadership is needed, rather than authoritarian and arbitrary leaders. It should be emphasized that firm leadership does not mean cruel and arbitrary leadership. Firm leadership is effective and decisive leadership exercising authority in accordance with the aspirations and needs of the people.

Thus, one of the fundamental problems in Indonesia is how to seriously rearrange bureaucracy in order for it to become clean and professional. Following that, law enforcement institutions must be prioritized because these institutions -such as the police, prosecutor's office, the Corruption Eradication Commission, and the courts- are the spearheads in our movement towards becoming free from the practices and culture of corruption. Law enforcement institutions are often described as the "broom" which will be used to clean the house of our nation from the dirt of corruption. What happens when we "sweep" the house with a dirty "broom" is that the dirt will stick all over the floor and walls of the house of our nation.

The main reason behind the limited success of endeavors for bureaucratic reform is that the system, procedures and mechanisms as well as the officials who have the automatic tendency to work in a corrupt manner have been developed for decades. This is coupled with the political leadership which is still left with plenty of old players who have remained unchanged and who have the interest to protect the corrupt practices involving them. On the other hand, new leaders are emerging without a vision, rather, they only wish to enjoy the opportunities and chance for corruption which they never had before. Many political and bureaucratic officials view the reform as an opportunity to get their turn to loot the state's wealth. They view the reform as their turn for corruption.

A bureaucracy well-established with corruption tends to be resistant to bureaucratic reform efforts. There is a tendency not to implement the adopted policies seriously and consistently, especially when not supported by the leaders' policies. This is because the old bureaucratic system brought benefits and comfort, while the bureaucratic reform to be implemented is seen as not necessarily offering the same benefits and comfort, and even posing a threat on the existing benefits and comfort. This is not to mention the fear of corrupt practices committed in the past being exposed.

However, many such efforts towards synergy have not demonstrated any results because each institution and their respective apparatuses lack a common commitment to implement the same. In addition to the issues of organizational communication and the ability to move the organization, the problem has also been caused by the

persisting atmosphere of unfair competition and the corps spirit that tends to be negative, all of which further deteriorate the mutual blockade situation. This point brings us to the issue of leadership at various levels, which has in fact failed in driving its institutions and apparatuses.

Based on the foregoing, I can conclude that a variety of problems in Indonesia have not been caused by any conceptual-paradigmatic fault or the normative regulation thereof, but rather, they have been caused by the deviation of democracy from its underlying system. Such deviation is marked by transactional and mutual hostage-taking politics as a result of which the law cannot be enforced.

In my view, the major problems in Indonesia can only be resolved through law enforcement in the sense of making the law as the commander. The efforts to make the law as the commander must begin with the structuring of political recruitment in order to make it free of transactional and mutual hostage-taking politics. This is where the awareness of political parties as the forum for political leadership recruitment is required in order to conduct recruitment with full responsibility and by upholding moral integrity.

Discourses of the Pancasila State

Despite many Indonesians' distrust in the New Order's bills or policies relating to the concepts of the Pancasila State, and that these policies failed to be implemented properly, it still seemed certain that the objectives were related to the goals of suppressing primordial politics, economic injustice, and the Islamic privileges, all of which were represented in the ideals of Pancasila discussed in 1945. Yet, as seen earlier, this "imagined community," wherein different societal groups were expected to subject their interests to those of the nation for the sake of harmony and order, was inherently vulnerable. While rejecting the concept of a majority based upon ethnic or religious ties, the concepts of the Pancasila State inevitably encapsulated the "beneficiaries"/ "victims" relations along these lines in Indonesian society.

In general, the major beneficiaries included certain strata in society. Non-Muslims or nominal Muslims could contain the demands of orthodox Muslims for further Islamization of society. Thus, orthodox Muslims opposed the concepts of the Pancasila State because the concepts clearly segregated religion from the public domain. Politically, the president and the army were assured of their position within the social order, while the masses and political parties were suppressed as potentially disruptive to the social fabric. Nevertheless, many Indonesians opposed the containment of mass participation in politics and the government's domination of this sphere. Economically, the indigenous people and their economic agencies, including cooperatives and the government sector, maintained an advantage over foreigners, including Chinese Indonesians and private companies.

The latter had to deal with various economic sanctions from the state trying to implement a Pancasila Economy and its vision of a moral economy founded on social justice. The history of the Pancasila State throughout these eras was characterized by the continuous contention of “victimized” groups with the “unfair” imposition of the concepts of Pancasila by the state. The opposition of the victim groups to the concepts of Pancasila created confusion, difficulty, and frustration for the government as it sought to balance diverse social and political interests. This difficulty in adjusting the various interests allowed the state to legitimize its strong authority with the agenda of balancing such interests.

Unlike general scholarly opinion on this subject, I believe that the failure of Pancasila during the New Order period was not entirely caused by the government utilizing the concepts of the Pancasila State, particularly Pancasila Democracy, for its political purposes. It is true that the New Order’s authoritarianism and the rampant corruption undermined its legitimacy and standing in the eyes of the people. However, a more fundamental problem was the inability to balance rival interests that were at times irreconcilable. In other words, the failure resulted from the fact that the government was neither strong nor skillful, and did not possess the legitimacy to implement its policies or bills formulated on the ideals of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The societal groups during these times were not entirely victimized entities, as portrayed by Western observers. The state could not successfully check and control the various interests of such societal groups, which were concerned about potential political, economic, and social implications of consensus with the Pancasila State.

The key change in the discussions was found in the placement of the Pancasila State within the context of a civil society. The presenters of the symposium pointed out that past Indonesian national leaders’ promotion of the family state (as a concept of a strong state) as the right basis for the Pancasila State was a cunning political tactic to justify the much larger role of the state vis-à-vis society (Azra 2006: 146). While citing the civil society as the basic ground for the Pancasila State, the presenters declared that the first critical problem facing the post-Suharto era, for which Pancasila could provide solutions, would be ethnic and religious polarization.

How is Indonesia’s Democracy Doing?

After more than a decade since the fall of Suharto, Indonesian politics has been persistently illiberal in nature. Though elections grew increasingly free and fair after 1998, the expansion of electoral politics has not transformed the clientelist nature of Indonesian politics. Thus despite the expectation that post-Suharto Indonesia would embark on a swift process of change towards a liberal mode of governance, the empowerment of civil society forces has not occurred. The primary motivation of the article was to account for why an illiberal form of politics still persists even

after “democratic transition,” which in theory should have been accompanied by the gradual removal of authoritarian elements. To do this, the article first pointed to the irrelevance of liberal theory in the context of Indonesia and suggested that a redirection of research strategy is needed (Mahfud, Moch, 2012).⁴

From the outset the article emphasised the importance of breaking free from the historical determinism implicit within a liberal interpretation of political change in Indonesia and bringing the insights of area specialists, who question its relevance to East and Southeast Asia, to the wider theoretical debate on democratic transition. In particular, the article took issue with the clear separation of state and society implicit in liberal theory. Instead of searching for civil society forces pressuring the state, the article suggested that one should look for what is occurring within the state.

While keeping his insight that democratization offers a mechanism through which to manage elite cleavages, the clientelist model placed greater emphasis on politics, rather than on economic policy, as the key factor leading to the emergence of elite cleavages. From this perspective, political transition offers a mechanism through which to manage intra-elite conflict fought between different centres of predatory power over the distribution of patronage. Since the mid 1990s, the proportion of countries in the world that are democracies – countries that meet the standard of at least electoral democracies in the sense that they can choose their leaders and replace them in free and fair elections – has stagnated, at around 60 and 62.5 per cent. The world is experiencing a democratic recession. There are three dimensions of this.

Firstly, there is levelling off of in the extent of democracy. Secondly, there has been a rise in incidence of democratic breakdown in the world. Of the 29 democratic breakdowns since the third wave of democratization began in 1974, 17 (59 per cent) have occurred since 1999. Thirdly many of these democratic breakdowns have happened in places that can be considered big, strategically important states, powers in their regions, and peers of Indonesia.

Indonesia is now labelled by Freedom House as a ‘free country’ – although this is a somewhat misleadingly broad category. Nevertheless, Indonesia is doing better today than any of the democracies that lost democracy were at the time they lost it. A worrisome trend is the recent erosion not only of democracy but of levels of freedom. The last three years – 2006, 2007, 2008 – are the first three successive years

⁴ “Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, the Republic of Indonesia. In fact, political transition in Indonesia was caused by a serious disruption of the stable circulation of patronage. This produced a significant gap between the expectations of an increasing number of political elites and the performance of Suharto’s patrimonial state. In this context, political reform proceeded in ways that former “outsiders” regained access to patronage which was previously dominated by an exclusive circle of “insiders.” This model explains not only the continuity from the Suharto era, which liberal theory is ill-placed to account for, but also some subtle and yet no less significant changes, which are often overlooked by some area specialists who tend to emphasise continuity from the authoritarian past.”

since the end of the Cold War when the number of countries declining in a given year in their levels of freedom exceeded the number of countries improving their levels of freedom.

The fact that Indonesia is holding its own at a *relatively* good level of political rights and civil liberties is itself a noteworthy achievement. While Indonesia's civil liberties, political rights, and levels of governance have improved since 2005, it still has levels of governance, by a number of measures, which are in some respects in the category of vulnerability. The trend recently has been to suggest that Indonesia has either consolidated democracy or is very far along the path of doing so. There are grounds for being a little more sceptical.

Nevertheless, the level of public support for democracy in Indonesia compares favourably compared to other regions of the world. Globally there is a growing ambivalence toward democracy. In East Asia and Africa only about half of respondents, in various surveys, on average rejected all of the 3 authoritarian options put to them: the military coming back to power; one party rule; and getting rid of parliament and having a strong ruler decide everything. The cause of this is basically the reputation a government has in respect of bad governance.

So, how do Indonesia's levels of governance and democracy fare in these comparisons?⁵

A common story is that Indonesia began, at its moment of democratic transition in 1998, with pretty bad governance on most measures. One measure of governance is economic performance. Indonesia's average rate of GDP growth during the past decade has been respectable compared to a set of other significant emerging market democracies regionally and globally.

The rule of law in Indonesia has barely improved at all, and is still very weak. This is something we should worry about. And this is why we should exercise some

⁵ Indonesia's Human Development Index (HDI) score, perhaps the most meaningful measure of economic development – incorporating standards of living, health, and education – improved almost 10 per cent between 1995 and 2006, reaching 73 per cent. This rate of improvement is greater than many of its peers, such as the Philippines and Thailand, and Indonesia has now almost caught up with the Philippines in terms of its HDI score.

A number of measures of governance used by the World Bank are also useful. In 1998 Indonesia was in the bottom quintile in the world in terms of its level of voice and accountability. Only about 7 or 8 countries have improved their voice and accountability score as dramatically as Indonesia has. It now outranks several other countries, even Turkey surprisingly, and has overtaken the Philippines as well. But Indonesia is still out ranked by some more established democracies in East Asia. In control of corruption Indonesia's improvement in performance has been even more dramatic. But it started from an incredibly low level at the 9th percentile that it is still in the bottom third in the world. While Indonesia has now taken a higher position than the Philippines in terms of control of corruption too, it clearly needs to go further.

caution in advancing a judgement that democracy in Indonesia is now consolidated. Even with respect to some not very well performing countries in the region, in terms of rule of law Indonesia finishes dead last among the democracies or quasi democracies in Asia.

Indonesia has of course improved its Freedom House score dramatically more than any of the countries in the sample. But again, it started from such a low level that it still has ground to catch up despite the improvements. On the rule of law and political stability, things got worse between 1998 and 2003. Here you can really see the impact of the Yudhoyono presidency in terms of bringing about, or at least witnessing, significant improvements in the quality of governance.

Conclusion

Whatever the case may be, Pancasila as the state philosophy, the ideology and way of life of the people, and as a unifying instrument of the Indonesia nation, to which we have consented for the past 67 years, cannot be replaced by any other ideology; because by replacing it, the nation will crumble, due to the fact that there is an abundant number of discerning factors which may cause the disintegration of our nation. The United States of America is terra firma, we are an archipelago, and the only integrative factor is Pancasila, which unites us as a nation.

Hence, the remaining issue is how we can actualize and revitalize the noble values inherent in Pancasila into all aspects of our lives and the development of our nation. We must be of one say and action, beginning with the leaders of the nation. In the past two years, the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia, has recommenced to promote the four Pillars of Nationalism, namely Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and Bhineka Tunggal Eka (Unity in Diversity). This is to be implemented by the members of the Indonesian Parliament, who are also members of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia. The subject of Pancasila is again introduced into the elementary and high school curriculum. This is implemented because there are clear indications of the erosive trend regarding comprehension, and behaviour that no longer conform to Pancasila, may even cause the elimination of Pancasila from our lives.

Parliament must be stalwart in overseeing the Government, in order for the direction and policies of Development in any and all fields to be in accordance with the values of Pancasila. The direction and strategy of our development should be founded on the values of Pancasila, it must be able to alleviate poverty and ignorance, able to eradicate corruption and injustice, able to encourage development that is "pro-poor", "pro job" and "pro sustainable development". Development based on Pancasila is a continuation of reform, one that is able to carry out "nation and character building". National development that carries on the 1998 Reform, should in essence be the Implementation of Pancasila. So that Pancasila becomes a living

ideology that can be put into action. This effort must not fail, because failure may lead people to seek alternative ideologies, and that is what will disintegrate the nation.

The role of Community Organizations must continue and improve, as they are able to encourage brotherhood, unity, and unanimity in the spirit of tolerance. The values of Pancasila must constantly be revitalized, to prevent them from becoming obsolete, and at all times be relevant and able to solve issues concerning the nation and State, toward the attainment of a better future, which is a common future. This common future is the future of all ethnic groups, of all ethnic classes and religions, the future of all of us that have determined to be united in an Archipelagic State which is multiethnic, multiracial, and although possessing a large number of disintegrating factors, are strongly bonded in unity, with, by and because of Pancasila.

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