

## HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA – SHORTSIGHTED, NEARSIGHTED OR LACKING FORESIGHT?

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### **Abstract:**

*Like all the fields of non-traditional security, human security is exceptional in standing, and in gig and guise as well. Its sterling qualities and characteristics arise from the departure from the central interest for the acts of the state on the global arena to those that are most affected by these acts: the people. Human security is all-encompassing! It does not target the forming exception of only debriefing reports upon the people with a citizenship status within states. It purposes the obtaining of fuller insights into the people belonging to all nations, ethnicities and races. In Southeast Asia, the qualifications of the relevance of human security are highly tested, as the states of the region are underway of recovery from the catechizing of too much concentration on state-survival, statehood and on ensuring the instrumentalities for the preservation of independence. Throughout this article, the author strives to delve into the significant expansion of human security issues for the focus of audit and canvass of the regional elites` actions, by pinpointing the chief counter-invitations to engage into such an effect of emergence of human security in Southeast Asia.*

**Keywords:** Non-Traditional Security, Human security, Nation-State, Sovereignty, Underdevelopment, Caring Societies, Connectivity

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### **1. The Forgotten Knowledge of Human Security in Security Studies**

The field of **non-traditional security** produces a list of unending links to conceptual situations where hard reasoning finds its best suited shelter. The attenuation of this hard reasoning may never be out of use! In the course of the demonstrations of this concept, it is quite hard to delineate an inestimable labor-saving apparel, in which the difficulty for introducing the best perspective to analyze the intricacies of **non-traditional security**<sup>1</sup> can be eradicated without undue

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<sup>1</sup> The concept of **human security** emerged in 1994; It was a shining example of the marvelous twist of focus that was happening in global affairs: the institutions of global governance were oriented towards ensuring protective measures for the people, and for the individual, first and foremost; The state was, nonetheless, **the most enduring creation**, in institutional terms, ever produced; **State sovereignty** was a given datum of the international system and something whose infringement

optimism. Can we find a solid set of pegs on which all the reasoning is hung? As Uphadhyaya Priyankar suggests, the concepts of **non-traditional security** and especially **human security** have been put into a more organic shape, when it has finally been understood that the concept of **security** can no longer be solely put on the blackboard of examination of the sovereign action of the state. This is a glittering generality that was prevalent during the convenient political axioms of the conflict periods that ignited such a monopole approach of state-action in the security field, brought along, first and foremost by the two world conflagrations that were lead off from an European setting : “The traditional notion of security has derived typically from the growth of nation-states in Europe. Having resolved their internal security challenges through a long and arduous process of state building, the European nation-states understandably defined security exclusively in the context of a state’s ability to counter external threats to its state’s vital interests and core values. The state, as the exclusive referent object of security, was to guarantee the security of “citizens.” The two World Wars, followed by the intense bipolar jostling, schematized the state-centric notion of security and reinforced its militaristic trappings. The western politico-military constellations were quick to define the international security in terms of the East-West confrontation and viewed any policy of abstaining from the Cold War with suspicion” (Uphadhyaya:2004).

It would be a little too far-fetched to say that **human security** suffers from ill-definition! When it first emerged, in 1994, it was a conceptual theme assignment for both definition and content-assumption. Between the **why fors** and the **why nots**, the concept stirred quite a lot of controversial debate around it. Actually, it was a welcome controversial debate, as the concept virtually risked non-acceptance from

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could not be tolerated; In 1994, in a **Development Report of the United Nations**, the people-oriented approach began to be viewed as an instrumental utility for preventing the state to become an overachiever, in the pursuing of **its sovereignty goals** and **set-about**; The forward motion in finding a justification for each and every state-action, no matter how obtrusive and immoral it may have been, had to be halted; Too abstract structures and notions were not thought to deserve the same reverence they received in the past; A breakup from such visions had to be supported, even at the cost of posing a challenge to the omnipresence of the state in global affairs; The global normative network had to be amended properly in order to allow the policymaking of the global agenda to pursue the due causes of the next millennium; **Human security** was not to be clipped off from the patent of the state or from state intervention in its constitutive affairs; It was to be built as an inherent target of state action and state preoccupations; In making it a foreign policy tool, state action would receive another compass through which it could be able to make its actions more normative-complacent; **Human security** was also designed to be a well groomed tool of international law, by making the individual a subject of international law; International law could legislate the sphere of action of the individual in global affairs and the amount of residual influence the individual could retain in global affairs; State action was no longer universal in scope and amplex; The security or insecurity of the individual was a securitizing issue and a conditional element of the national interests of the states, partaking in the international system;

government decision-makers around the world and from the academic circles that tried to render its area of employment and the important sectors of its communicating domains idle and immaterial. For supporters, the question was: how can we make **human security** not to be helpless in the orbit of its actions? The contenders of introducing such a concept were orienting their criticism towards the brief-bag of its actual ideological references: did this mean a return to the **pre-Westphalian treaties**<sup>2</sup>? Which intentions these views upon **human security** actually disguised?

Actually, in all the definitions that the concept of **human security** offered, state-mediated interventions received a measure of supra-state coordination and monitoring. Quintessentially, **human security** meant that something existed above and beyond the state, and that should be tarnished by state intervention or action. This something is the **human being** – as a participant in the inter-state international system and as the ultimate reflective of the decisions taken by the inter-governmental fora of the global system of states. The conventional empowering factoring of **security** has been set in the realm of military and political aspects of reducing challenges and of acquiescing stability. In its larger attempts of definition, **security** refers to the ensemble of means with which a state engages itself for the performance of liberty of action, for the reduction of threats and challenges. Likewise, a state is the problem-solver of insecurities, anxieties and fears that menace its territory, its capacity of interaction with other actors in the international system and the assurance of the protection of its population. Hence, **security** had an immunity for **human security**, also. In this framework, nevertheless, the state was its guarantee. **Human security**

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<sup>2</sup> **The Treaties of Westphalia** – adopted in 1648 – have a multi-layered significance for the international system of states; One of the first points of significance was **the absolute image of territorial integrity**; Only the nation-states could have at their disposal the just means of interference in their domestic structures; No-one could restrain such a right, exercised by the national actors; As such, outer forces did not have any say regarding the manner in which a state-actor understood to conduct and manage its own interests and goals, and the spheres of governance issues; **The Westphalian Treaties** did not maintain in the legitimate degree of **actorness** actors with interventionist policies –like **the Empire**; Besides from institutionalizing the primacy of states as decision-making actors for their own spheres of interests, another very important connotation was introduced for the international system of that time, a connotation that seemed to reside for a long time – **the equal status** that states were able to enjoy in the international system; Considering that none of them had the just prerogatives to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states, it meant that that all states were considered equal; Certainly, this distinction was not a successful one for ensuring equality of position and action; More nuanced details had to be introduced for the dismantling of the various interpretations that were born – could all states be equal, even if some of them existed for a long time before others were born?; The manner in which the states were born did not produce any significance?; How could the justness of the manner in which states were born not be taken in proper consideration?; What could entitle the bloody struggles for **national determination**?; How can the want and desire of the many be measured for the creation of **a nation-state**?; These questions would be the source for many struggles and inter-state conflicts that would plague the world and, especially, the European continent;

may risk the situation where it could not be ascertained and safeguarded, if during some sort of a perilous situation, the state decides to secure other threatened aspects first<sup>3</sup>. The emergence of **human security** was an indicative mood of the re-focus of the realm of definition from **its traditional pillars**, to its **non-traditional ones**.

In our view, Paul Evans manages to pull out some of the most suggestive commentaries of the shift that the empyrean of **security** vexations had been crossing, starting with the final decade of the 20th century: “**Human security** raises a challenge to **traditional** conceptions of **national** security by changing the referent point and introducing issues and means that extend beyond conventional security strategies. Philosophically, it raises fundamental issues related to conscience, obligations beyond borders, development, and domestic legitimacy. Politically, it raises questions about sovereignty, intervention, the role of regional and global institutions, and the relationship between state and citizen. **Insecure states** almost certainly produce **insecure citizens**” (Evans:2004). More or less, the same intimation is delivered by the **Commission on Human security** in the definitions it provides. As such, **human security** encompasses a commitment: „to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. **Human security** means protecting **fundamental freedoms – freedoms** that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build **on people’s strengths and aspirations**. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (**Outline of the Report of the Commission of Human security**: 2003).

Neither one of the definitions we included as bibliographical acknowledgements does not see **human security** as an adverse concept to state’s integrity in action. Moreover, it is a concept that is testimonial to the fact that **human rights** were introduced as an analytical area of not only international law, but also of foreign policy and International Relations as well<sup>4</sup>. They are a mix of factors which should

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<sup>3</sup> How long could **human security** stay as an unresolved issue?; How long could the state warrant the lack of enforcement of **human security**?; With the unveiling of many trans-national threats, immediately after the Cold War period and with the determination to improve the leverage of the safety of the **people’s security** as an unkempt aspect of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, **human security** began to come out into view as a frequently referred concept; It also sprung from the fact that no one could always be sure of the fairness of treatment that the state had to implement towards its citizens during the periods of conflict; After all, if we are speaking of Southeast Asia, all three of **the Indochina Conflicts** were denotative of the fact that some of the regional governments did not put the security of the population on the highest pedestal of action and concern;

<sup>4</sup> **Human rights** are beginning to be a combinatory informant of politics, military, security, international and domestic law; They are not at all de-linked from the analyses that are endorsed for the evaluation of inter-state relations and for the overall impact of a state-action; They are authoritative facts of this kind of potential employments of state-action, conduct and behavior in the international system;

not be answered evasively, but rather with inclusive dependability<sup>5</sup>. **Human rights** have three important underpinning: **economic and social, political** and **solidarity-related underpinnings**. They are a collection of prerogatives with which each individual is inherited with, throughout his/her life. They are dogmas with universal applicability and each transgression of such concepts must be signaled as transgression of the underlying laws of humanity.

If **human rights** were not thought of being associated with a normative groundwork until the years preceding the Second World War, **The Universal Declaration of Human rights of 1949** made them a household name in global politics<sup>6</sup>. **Human security** offered these principles a blueprint and an institutional frame for being enacted. This was the forgotten knowledge that **human security** stands for within the fountainhead of Security Studies. Its main articulations did not refer to a misalignment with state policies or with state integrity. Beyond what has been said, **human security** aims to introduce the tenet that all state-mediated actions should refer, into all their unveilings, above all, to the defense of the global and transnational dimensions of **human rights** and to the specious practicability of such ideals. As Xavier Furtado pinpoints: “**Human security** in the government statement seems to centre on the economic, social, and governance-related challenges of **underdevelopment**” (Furtado: 2000).

The relationship between the individual and the socio-political structures is also entangled, as Furtado explains in the governmental policies implemented, generators or not, of a certain welfare. In this perspective, **human security** is simultaneous with the way the multisource variables of change are implemented or redesigned. **Human security** is a concept that demands new perspectives. These perspectives regard the state of financial and economic security in the individual sphere of manifestation. The debate around **human security** does not stand much importance if the particular social and economic contexts in which the individual carries on his social and private life are not built on economic pillars that permit more illumination to his wellbeing. If such things cannot be procured, **human security** facilitates only old conversations regarding the shaping of some certain debentures and guarantees regarding the individual. Total anxiety and fear are not totally displaced.

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<sup>5</sup> Another conceptual distinction has to be made, without disregard for the parallel passages or matters that both **human rights** and **human security** might be sending; **Human rights** refer to a corps of a panoply of concepts with normative delimitation with which a person is invested with, ever since birth and to which he/she hold sprperty until their physical disappearance; **Human rights** represent a trans-national and universal bearer of reference; The local interpretations of **human rights** may risk narrowing their application, a fact that runs counter with their own essence; They transcend national concepts, such as: **citizenship**;

<sup>6</sup> This document drew the overabundance of its inspiration form the principles that French Revolution of 1789 shielded from destruction; After centuries of inter and intra-state conflicts, these principles began to be claimed and defended as treasures and legacies of mankind;

The concept of **underdevelopment** introduces new dialogues in the sphere of **human security**, by taking into account the refusal to intervene and the way the state chooses to intervene for the ensuring of the proper pledge from the lack of certainty and safety that can occur in social life<sup>7</sup>. As we have shown, the concept of **human security** accommodates many regiments of ideas: a field of plenty of conceptualizing and practice for conceptualizing. In the next section of this article, we will underscore the portraiture of **human security** in Southeast Asia. We will not be insisting on conceptuality. We will have to contrive, however, some ideas of conceptuality, where the implementation of policies of **human security** differ from the normative prescriptions foretold within a legislative and socio-cultural bust. Some edge of significance from the concept of **human security** has been cleansed away, unfortunately. The concept of **human security** rests on a quadrangle of principles and norms. It is not worth discussing the superiority in station of any of them, as all of them have to be assimilated, so that the concept can produce its effects, unharmed by factors that can constrict and cramp its meaning. Unfairly, **human security** is all too often tantamount to the respect for **human rights** and civil liberties<sup>8</sup>. In Southeast Asia, the exchange of views and ideas regarding **human security** rests on the general knowledge that the state of freedom can cease to exist, in order for **human security** to be as bountiful as possible for the citizens and for the people residing in the region<sup>9</sup>.

## 2. Southeast Asia and Human security – Pursuing to What Conclusion?

**Human security** in Southeast Asia has been scattered conceptually. At least, immediately after World War II, the situation was as presented. Governments have used the instrumentation of state policies first and foremost to ensure the defense of national borders and of the national territory. No hurry was pressed on the regional governments to follow-up the recommendations of protecting the individual and bringing to a successful issue the protection of its private sphere of interests, objectives, desires. As the governments consolidated their strong hold on power in

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<sup>7</sup> In this new approach, it does not mean that the individual is actually defenseless in the face of state policies and, especially, in the way a state acts towards the protection of its own sphere of interests and security needs; It means that the individual and the state are so complex that, unavoidably, one affects and influences the other; Therefore, each state policy has to take into account the protection not only of **human rights**, but also of any signal that circulates regarding the way the individual accrues his/her economic means for survival and for a decent way of life;

<sup>8</sup> Being passable to their protection from infringement;

<sup>9</sup> This resort of curtailing some significance is explained by the fact that something has got to give, in the pursuit of ensuring **human security**; As in the case of **human rights**, **human security** is not a **global concept**, approved and addressed in its globally defined parameters; We mean, by this, that the interest in **human rights** is global, but the way in which they are put into effect and applied is different;

their political domestic environments, these ideas prevailed as the trespassing of the individual freedom to decide and act accordingly. Restrictions on political activism, on the discontent towards public policies and decisions, on implements of interstate if these provoke much disturbance to the individual. In Southeast Asian, and East Asian approach of **human security**, in order to prospect more capaciously, **human security** is not a dimension of **individual subjectivity**<sup>10</sup>. As Paul Evans punctuates, the profound consequences regarding **human security** in East Asia are categorized within the consequences regarding what the regional governments think they know about public affairs and how the importance of sovereignty is confirmed: “Asian reactions to **human security** have been divided and fluid in the past decade, initially somewhere between cool and hostile and recently more positive in civil society, academic, and governmental circles. The conventional wisdom is that East Asia is resistant to concepts of **security** that, in normative terms, have the potential to erode traditional conceptions of **sovereignty** and, in policy terms, demand a new allocation of resources to manage an array of nontraditional security challenges well beyond military threats to territorial integrity”.

We have clarified that **human security** lies beyond the traditional scope of the concept of **security**. In Southeast Asia, if we are to treat the question of **human security** thoroughly, we will have to take into account the most cogent factors for the clarity of outline of this concept. In Southeast Asia, the coinage of **human security** has to do with the functioning of the state and to the determination of the limits of the performance of these functional duties. Southeast Asia is replete with very young democracies, struggling to survive and to impose an insidiousness of **non-interventionism** in the capture of more and more societal functions<sup>11</sup>.

Southeast Asia is also hosting homewards systems which constitute the middle ground between **democracy** and autocratic regimes. Myanmar is currently facing challenges for the implementation of what Barrack Obama called – “**flickers of hope**” as far the introduction of openness and international law-obedient principles in foreign policy behavior and in the structuring of the domestic institutions, as well. The processes of political transformation in Southeast Asia have not been unilinear processes. A commixture of factors has aggregated the traits of the political regimes being

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<sup>10</sup> Certainly, if we take into consideration the provisions regarding the ensuring of the proper means for economic and financial welfare, **the dimension of individual subjectivity** is not characterized by an ample breadth; Certainly, as we have shown in the above clarifications, the situation that **human security** aims for, does not envision a state responsible for the financial prosperity of an individual; But, it has to pay enough attention in order not to make this ideal impossible to attain;

<sup>11</sup> The survival effect of these democracies is to concentrate as much power as possible in order not to be confronted with anti-subsistence forces; **The democratic model** has very unlikely features in Southeast Asia, especially because of this reason; **Democracy** is a cell survival for statehood, but it is not applied within its generally agreed upon meanings and orientations;

implemented in Southeast Asia in the current unveilings of the times. This commixture arises from the repression of the ethnic minority groups in parts of Southeast Asia. In Myanmar, the outstanding number of 135 ethnical minority groups vellecated intranational discontent in many milestone moments in Myanmar's history and political development. The Karen rebellion against the Burmese majority and their ardor for the creation of a Karen state in Lower Burma has perpetuated a long twine line of domestic conflicts, menacing the existence of the Burmese states for protracted periods of time. Thailand has 70 ethnic groups, per total. The Southern parts of Thailand – the Malay Pattani region- are archetypes of violent separatism, with which the Thai government has had to contend with over a long-drawn-out period of time.

The destabilizing potential of these ethnic groups are patchworks of an enlarged image that is a harsh reality for **human security** in Southeast Asia. Some of these ethnic groups have longed for, during the fullness of time, an independent status in the institutional experience of statehood. For instance, this is the case of the **Moro Islamic Liberation Front** in Philippines. Several initiatives for this kind of goal-oriented deeds have been taken off, undermining the governmental authority in the Southern provinces of Philippines – where this group has given havoc to local authority. In Southeast Asia, **ethnicity** and its contribution to the confined problems of state functionality is triggered by a mix of factors, which has defines adequate and rather inappropriate policies, as well. It has become increasingly clear that any approach or policy solutions are deemed to be comprehensive in both scope and nature and chronically and continually annoyed by details.

Another combo of factors that throws into utter disorder the ontogeny of **human security** in Southeast Asia is the authoritarianism and the minifying of grass-root democracy in the region. The voice of the civil society organizations in Southeast Asia is recently displayed and still quite underrepresented. Its virtual emergence is actually owed to the pruning effect that the assault and spread of Western-type culture has had upon statehood in Southeast Asia. Modern ideas regarding the emancipation of the voice of the people especially in decision-making structures has given some new scrolls of termination for the statehood architecture in the region. Political openness and scrutiny by non-state actors was not a fact of a common occurrence in Southeast Asia. Censorship was a case of compulsory doing in Southeast Asia, an imperative for the ensuring of security for all the members of society. It was presented more like a natural wrong, rather than a wrongdoing, something the people of the region had to learn to be accustomed with, if their need for safety had to be met in a quite flighty and inconstant domestic environment.

**The 1998 Asian Financial Crisis** showed the regional leaders that a pliancy of implementation regarding total control in society would have to be worked up in order for the domestic governance systems to take up clarion shapes and to deliver results. It was then that, with the acknowledgment of the shortfalls that the sort of



capitalism practiced by the regional states, came the creasing intention to allow more space of action and manifestation for the domestic civil society organizations<sup>12</sup>. It was moreover a compromise on both sides. On the one hand, the governments could not risk the economic unrest to backfire socially. On the other hand, it was clear for the people of Southeast Asia that they were determined to find some points of leverage to concentrate a presence within the public decision-making mechanisms and to allow a notable devolution of power towards societal organisms. The change produced was not and it is still not bewildering: “However, some regimes proved much more durable than this prognosis anticipated. In particular, among the dynamic Asian countries that seemed to be inexorably clawing their way up the global economic ladder was a number of politically stable authoritarian regimes where the free flow of ideas and information had remained unlikely. Authoritarianism in Singapore and Malaysia seemed capable of reproducing itself for the foreseeable future” (Rodan:2004).

The transcripts of authoritarianism are still present in everyday life. Throughout the Asian continent, these types of organizations are often referred to as **civil society resource organizations**. Their emergence is influenced, first and foremost, by **the process of transition to democracy** that occurred in certain domestic environments in Southeast Asia<sup>13</sup>. The financial subsidies of their existence are mostly supplied by certain types of actors that have both an interest and a potential to take part in the development of the domestic societies in Southeast Asia. Most organizations are locally or publicly owned. Others are steered by corporate actors, interested in promoting a self-interest image in the domestic societies of Southeast Asia, but, in the main, they strive for securing advantages for their own well-being. **Civil society resource organizations**, militating for a sectional views on societal issues and for certain causes that trigger public interests, are not easy to find, giving the fact that the betokening of financial means for their institutional actuality.

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<sup>12</sup> The discontent towards the tight clench and clutch of the government upon all the institutional re-imbusement of social life was brought to light, with a lot of zeal of indignation; This vexation came from the failures of the government in the economic sphere; Liberty of action (more precisely, the annulment of the liberty of action!) was the price to be paid for the economic upsurge that the state was able to supply in some cases ; Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia were these cases; However, when the capacity to deliver those results was weakened the question was: what was the point of authoritarianism?; With civil society palled upon the decisions taken by the government, the toilsomely implemented state authoritarianism had to loosen its proceedings in some aspects of the social life; This is why **the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis** was thought to be such a relinquishing moment;

<sup>13</sup> For instance, in Indonesia, the proliferation of such organizations has to be under discharge of recognition for the political and economic developments that transgressed the country; Their egress into public profile is mainly linked to the downfall of Suharto in 1998; After the elections that followed, their tasks of public quagmire involved electorate education; Exercising choice was an anew topic in Indonesia, since, for the first time, it was actually carried out in in a free and fair manner;

In all the regional countries, these means of causation produce and reproduce massive concern. As well, added to them, the geography of the region, with natural cataclysms waiting to happen<sup>14</sup>, have returned other worries and have shown the nest of problems that **human security** is dealing with in Southeast Asia. Ever since 1967, all the preoccupation ejected regarding **human security** in Southeast Asia has been referred to the regional forum that perpetuates nowadays a more and more ablaze presence and relevance for the regional states: the **Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN**. Security is not –in the military and defense sense- a matter of approach for **ASEAN**<sup>15</sup>. Despite this blank locality for action concerning non-traditional matters for security, **human security** has been taken up as a subject of care and disquietude only recently, with the adoption of the **ASEAN Charter** and of **ASEAN 2020 Vision**. In Article 10, Chapter 1 of **the ASEAN Charter**, one important objective regarding **human security** is stated: “[One of the purposes of **ASEAN** is:] to develop human resources through closer cooperation in education and life-long learning, and in science and technology, for the empowerment of the peoples of **ASEAN** and for the strengthening of the **ASEAN Community**” (**ASEAN Charter**:2008).

The awakening of the civil society is being undertaken, with very small steps in Southeast Asia. The solicitude for this factor is congealed by the high levels of interstate fixture fastening currently taking place. The connectors between Southeast Asian societies have been enhanced as an objective through the creation of **caring societies**<sup>16</sup>. As Collins explains: “The first core element, building a **community of caring societies**, is principally concerned with poverty alleviation and. it addresses a wide range of issues from education provision to combating human- and narcotics-trafficking through to health matters, such as access to affordable medicines and preventing the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The second core element, managing the social impact of economic integration, is principally concerned with the impact of economic integration on the labor market and it addresses issues such as mutual skills recognition to enable labor mobility throughout an integrated **ASEAN market**. The third core element, enhancing environmental sustainability, is

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<sup>14</sup> The recorded stage of cataclysms includes: tsunamis, flooding due the mismanagement of rainfall in certain parts of the region, disastrous climate effects of the intense volcanic activity;

<sup>15</sup> It is not a forum to which the regional states refer to, in terms of providing safety against outer perpetrators or in terms of requiring the rethinking of their military strategies; Even with the attempts to create an **ASEAN Security Community** until 2015, strategic concepts regarding a supra-national mechanism of coordination for the domestic military instruments have not been contemplated for the future of such conjuring; It is still improbable for **ASEAN** to take on such skyline tasks for the future;

<sup>16</sup> A stimulant for the people of **ASEAN** to take part together in socially-related actions and in providing the popular equivalents for accomplishing **greater integration**;

concerned with developing mechanisms for environmental governance and seeks to do this by promoting sustainable development of forest, water and marine resources, as well as managing transboundary pollution. The final element, strengthening the foundation of regional social cohesion, is concerned with creating an **ASEAN identity** for the people while maintaining the region's diverse cultural heritage" (Collins:2008).

One obvious countenance of **human security** in Southeast Asia is that it needs far more **ASEAN** fostering. While the domestic geography within the regional states of Southeast Asia can be divisive, the geography of the region does not provide mainstream apportionments between the regional states. The states and the societies of Southeast Asia have learned to co-exist. Certainly, rehearsal and the practice of rehearsal makes best! If **ASEAN` s involvement** cannot be fostered prominently in other sectors, this is one sector in which **ASEAN` s success** is mostly connected with action. The sense of **the shared destiny** is more than an artifact promoted by the regional spin-doctors of **ASEANism**<sup>17</sup>. The quandaries of **human security** in Southeast Asia require more aggregated reasoning and inferring. Despite the fact that **ASEAN` s power of intervention** in the domestic environment of the regional states is limited, **ASEAN** may use its plurality of authority in less sensitive areas, such as non-traditional security in order to make a difference! The notes of approval handed on by the regional elites have shown the fact that the tendency of collective re-distribution towards **ASEAN` s interposition** in **human security-related issues** is greater now than it was in the past<sup>18</sup>.

### **Cloture Statements**

The input for institutionalized mechanism for the influencing of domestic decision-making in terms of **human security** is beginning to receive brawny and durable treatments in Southeast Asia, through the intercession of **ASEAN policies**. We have shown that, even though **the primadonna status** in security studies belongs to more traditional spheres of security, **human security** has become solicitious arena of study in contemporary security affairs. This reference of touching upon **human security** was delivered by the inter-flux of matter affairs that the global system of states, inter-state relations and international organizations of all sorts is experiencing. For Southeast Asia, one cloture statement stands out: **regionalism** has tried, but has not adequately managed to defeat **globalization**! In the particular perspectives of **human security**, more regional action is needed in Southeast Asia, not only as a

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<sup>17</sup> A term utilized by the author in order to underline the regional elites` aficionados for **ASEAN` s existence**;

<sup>18</sup> After proving themselves that **statehood fragility** can be both **objective** and **transitive**, the regional elites have sensed the slumbering voltage that **human security** can nourish for collective action.

protection sensor against globalization, but also as a harbor of guardianship against the dearth of too much connectivity, for which some of the regional states are still ill-prepared!

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